DEPOLITICIZATION OF ULEEBALANG DESCENDANTS DUE TO A HISTORY OF PAST VIOLENT CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

The study deals with the tragedy of violence that victimized the Uleebalangs and their descendants. This event happened at the beginning of Indonesia's independence (late 1945 to 1946) and continued when the DI/TII movement emerged between 1953 and 1962, known as Prang Cumbok (war of Cumbok). This research was conducted on the descendants of Uleebalangs who know the stories of violence experienced by their families in the city of Lhokseumawe, in the province of Aceh. This fact is interesting to examine because it is valuable in reconstructing the historical truth of the massacre of the Uleebalangs by the PUSA group. The study was conducted using a qualitative ethnographic approach. Data collection was carried out through live-in, observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGD) and document reviews. The data analysis process was carried out interactively through six different steps; data collection, data verification, data models, data coding, thematic data networks, meaning and conclusion. The results of this study indicate that the tragedy of Prang Cumbok is one of the dark stories that happened in Aceh at the beginning of Indonesia's independence. This tragedy has been forgiven by most of the families of the victims, but it has not been forgotten. Therefore, a fair historical reconstruction of the Cumbok tragedy is central to sustainable development planning in Aceh.

Keywords: Depoliticization, Uleebalang Descendants, History, Past Violent Conflict
INTRODUCTION

*Prang Cumbok* (The Cumbok War) was a social revolution in Aceh. When difference is deemed profane, the slaughter has begun. Civil war vibrates with anger portraying hatred. Ruthless destruction and robbery occurred frequently. A black history of this country is forgotten and left behind. It is the grim reality of Aceh that the authors themselves deem too grim. *Prang Cumbok* is considered one of the social revolution (Kurniawati, 2008; Satriya et al., 2018).

The start of the *Cumbok tragedy* occurred in early 1946, centered in Pidie. The peak of this event was triggered by a misunderstanding of the clergy and also the *Uleebalangs* (nobility) regarding the proclamation of independence of Indonesia on August 17, 1945 (Satriya et al., 2018). The conflict occurred between the two sides, the *Uleebalangs* and the *Ulamas* who have their own rulers and commanders. The *Uleebalangs* were led by Teuku Keumangan and his commander Teuku Daud Cumbok (the *Uleebalangs of Cumbok State*), while the *Ulamas* were led by Daud Bereueh and his commander Husin Al-Mujahid.

Japan, as a new power that emerged in East Asia, managed to seize the Malay Peninsula from British control. Since the enactment of the *Meiji Restoration* in Japan by Emperor Hirohito, the country of the samurai has continued to expand its territory westward to Asia to the point of clashing with Western powers who succeeded in conquering small Asian kingdoms. Japan, which has succeeded in influencing the Asian society, including Aceh as the elder brother of Asia and savior of the Asian nation, has succeeded in winning the hearts of the community and political figures of Aceh, especially the Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA) and Acehnese hulubalang (*Uleebalangs*) (Heryati, 2015).

Sayid Abu Bakar (1915-1985), a former madrassah teacher at the Seulimum Islamic College, who since 1941 had moved to become a religion teacher at a madrassah in Yan, Keudah, continued to try to get in touch with the Japanese military leaders to join their troops who intend to invade Aceh. Sayid Abu Bakar Alaydrus is a scion of Arab nobility born in Kampung Jawa, Kutaraja in 1915. He was a close friend of Ali Hasjmy while studying at Sumatra Thawalib Madrasah, West Sumatra. Sayid Abu Bakar who managed to get in contact with the Japanese military government, through Major Fujiwara who had the special mission of fostering Fifth Column F.Kikan (Fujiwara Kikan) in Taiping, was appointed by the Japanese to recruiting other Acehnese immigrants and also Sumatran immigrants to join the column they led. The nomads who were successfully recruited by Sayid Abu Bakar, then received secret agent training under Masubuchi Sahei, a former trader who has lived in Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula for 20+ years. Masubuchi Sahei was very fluent in Malay and even wrote a Japanese-Malay dictionary. On
September 20, 1941, he joined the fifth Colonel F. Kikan. During the Japanese occupation of Aceh, he played quite a significant role due to the various positions he held. Thanks to the good relations between the nomads and the Japanese, and the help of the people of Aceh who no longer trusted the Dutch East Indies government, the samurai troops finally managed to infiltrate Aceh and repel the troops. Dutch inwards (-, 2015; Syamsuar, 2020).

Since then, Aceh entered a new chapter under Japanese occupation and succeeded in expelling the Dutch colonial government as well as dissolving the Zelfbestuurder (self-governing government) formed by the Dutch East Indies. The victory of the Acehnese migrants who were dominated by the Ulamas and some of the Uleebalangs, by infiltrating the Japanese soldiers into their homeland and expelling the Dutch colonialists, did not receive the full support of the majority of the Zelfbestuurder (regional self-governing) formed by the Dutch East Indies. Zelfbestuurder, which was held by the Uleebalangs group, felt panicked because with the Japanese victory their position as kings in the regions would also be removed. Moreover, the Japanese who entered Aceh were fully supported by the Ulamas, political rivals of the Uleebalangs in Aceh. Meanwhile, Japanese military leaders who held full clearance in Aceh did not want to be bothered by the dispute between the two political elites. They instead took advantage of this situation to ingratiate themselves with both factions in order to win the Greater East Asia War (-, 2015; Di et al., 2010).

Mr. Isa Sulaiman wrote that in administering the government in Aceh, the military government enforced government policies by not indirectly using local elites. Several aristocrats sympathetic to F. Kikan, such as T. Nyak Arief, TM Ali Panglima Polem, T. Cut Hasan (1900-1946) and T. Ahmad Jeunieb, were entrusted with the guntyo (regional chief), which was previously controlled by the Dutch. Because the number of guntyo reached 21, influential commanders like TM Hasan Glumpang Payong, TM Daud Cumbok, T. Chik Mahmud Meureudu and T. Chik M. Daudsyah were promoted to become guntyo in their region. Only Sayid Abu Bakar and Marah Husein, Muhammadyah activists in Tapak Tuan, received the post of guntyo from F. Kikan, a non-Uleebalang. They respectively became guntyo in Bakongan and Singkil. While the Uleebalang, which did not get a position, was restored to its original position as son tyo. The Uleebalang in its new guntyo functions and its tyo is nothing but an instrument of military power which T. Idris, former guntyo Bakongan, 1943-1944 and guntyo Bireuen 1945-March 1946 classified as ”guntyo as foreman I and Sun tyo as foreman II” (Heryati, 2015).

METHODOLOGY

This research is an ethnographic study on the depoliticization of Uleebalang descendants due to the history of past violent conflicts. This study focuses on the situations and expressions of
Uleebalang descendants *regarding* past conflicts and current conditions. This research was conducted in 2022 in Lhokseumawe City, Aceh Province, Indonesia. The data was collected by observing historical phenomena of the families of existing victims. Direct observation is carried out by involving researchers who are present with the research subjects. The objective is to build a sociological imaginary on the past historical context of the community (Bhattacherjee, 2012). In-depth interviews were conducted to obtain information from families and personalities who serve as cultural representations and references for the local community. Documents related to the history of the *Uleebalang massacre* were also used as secondary data to enrich and reinforce the conclusions.

The data collected was analyzed interactively using the model proposed by (Miles, M.B, Huberman, A.M, dan Saldana, 2014; Moleong, 2019). The first step is data condensation, which includes the process of selecting, focusing, abstracting, and synchronizing fieldnotes. The next step is data display, where the data has been organized as a continuation of the data results in the data condensing process that was performed in the first step. The final step is conclusion/verification in which inferences are made from the interpretation of the data to find the understanding and meaning behind the data that has been collected. This step is the last step in the overall analysis process (Moleong, 2017).

**RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

The *Uleebalangs* who had been promoted to *guntyo* during the Japanese occupation later mocked the Uleebalangs who were members of F. Kikan. They laughed at the *ulema* because the *ulema* had not been appointed military administrative officers even though F. Kikan's militants were very meritorious and worked hard for Japan. Indeed, TM Hasan Glumpang Payong, T. Cut Hasan and TM Daud *Cumbok* had provided a report to the *kempetai* (secret police) which had the character of trapping the leaders of the PUSA. Accordingly, some of these *Ulema leaders*, such as Tgk. Mr. Daud Beureueh, MA Wahab Seulimum, TM Amin, Tgk. A. Husin Al Mujahid and Abu Bakar Adamy were interrogated by the *Kempetai*. However, they were able to defend themselves.

"*In a situation full of suspicion, the intimate relations that a person or group has with Japan have been met with great suspicion by their adversaries. This is said again when a policy or action of the military authority fate that harms their interests. Because according to the point of view of the disadvantaged parties, the birth of this policy is inseparable from the lobbying of their opponents*”, Isa Sulaiman in his book, History of Aceh, page 102. Tensions between the two rival groups were further heightened when the Military Authority overthrew police and judicial power in hulubalang
by establishing a district court (ku hoin) and religious courts (kadhi tyo) in each region of Uleebalang in early 1944 (Basri, 2017).

Isa Sulaiman said that the policy that hurt their position is sure to elicit a strong reaction from the Uleebalang group. T. Nyak Arief, President of Aceh Syu Sangi Kai and TM Hasan Glumpang Payong, then serving as guntyo Kutaraja/Vice President of Aceh Syu Sangi Kai strongly protested against the military government (Gunseikanbu) (Aspinall, 2009).

The reaction of the Uleebalangs also occurred on the lower level. The court which had been confirmed by the Japanese with Ibnu Saadan as judge in Tiho Hoin Sigli (1943-1944), was filed by TM Daud Cumbok and TM Hasan Glumpang Payong with the Sigli kempetai. He was accused of having close ties with the counter Lameulo. As a result, Ibnu Saadan was arrested (1944) and was only able to escape punishment after Tgk intervened. Mr. Daud Beureueh. The greatest dissatisfaction with these commanders was of course entirely directed against the Japanese military government, as all the policies implemented were very damaging to their side. As a result, in 1944, the Uleebalangs embittered by the Japanese government merged with the underground movement organized by O. Treffers (former deputy resident of Aceh Besar). In late 1944, many Uleebalangs were arrested by the kempetai due to reports from their political opponents. The captured Uleebalangs were fully involved in the underground movement. Those who held positions in the administrative structure of the military government were replaced because they were considered traitors, and then replaced by relatives loyal to radical groups (-, 2015).

1. The conflict of Ulamas and Uleebalangs

The Uleebalangs, believed to be zelfbestuurder during the sultanate, were minor absolute "kings". They held hereditary power in the name of the sultan. However, the longer the power was held by the Uleebalang, the weaker the bond between them and so they made up their minds and secretly seceded from the Sultan's government. This separation of course made it easier for settlers who entered Aceh to influence these petty kings. The Uleebalang, which had previously worked hand in hand with the clergy against the Dutch colonialists, gradually changed and sided with the Dutch and were loyal to them. While the clergy never accepted the "Dutch rule". Therefore, it is not surprising that in March 1942, during a rebellion against the Dutch, the Ulamas who joined the All Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA) allowed and cooperated with the Japanese to enter Aceh. These factors continue to exacerbate relations between the two parties. The Ulamas eventually decided to fight the Uleebalangs with the intention of abolishing the feudal system of government as well as Dutch rule when the Pacific War broke out. (El Ibrahimi, the role of Tgk. M. Daud Beureueh in the upheaval of Aceh).
The news of Indonesia's proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, which reached Aceh in September by means of a telegram sent by AK Gani, commissioner of the central government of Sumatra in Palembang, received a cold reception from several Uleebalangs. They even mocked the proclamation and intended to thwart it. (Abdullah Arif in his writing Around Cumbok's Betrayal). The actions taken by the Uleebalangs eventually led to a final agreement for the clerics to openly fight the zelfbestuurder. It started when Japan surrendered its weapons on December 4, 1946 in Sigli. In this incident, there was bloodshed in the fighting for the Japanese weapon, between the Ulema and the Uleebalang. Even though the fighting was extinguished by the Aceh regional government which had been formed since Indonesia's independence on December 6, the dispute between the two sides continued. This event, later known as the Cumbok Incident.

2. Prang Cumbok Timeline (Cumbok War)

El Ibrahimy testified that there were frequent fights between the Uleebalangs and the Ulamas at Pidie, the epicenter of two distinct tribes. Over 100 Uleebalangs, which had controlled Aceh for centuries in absolute terms, became small monarchies under Dutch control after Japan's defeat in August 1945.

The political climate in this region began to flare up in November 1945. The root cause was T. Daud Cumbok's inability to adapt to changing circumstances brought about by Indonesia's declaration of independence. Considering Japan to be a friend, T. Daud Cumbok and his companions wanted Japan to hand over their armaments to them. Moreover, they had pledged to grant independence to Indonesia while the Japanese were still in power. This is what prompted T. Daud Cumbok to acquire Japanese weapons in order to help the Indonesian resistance. Aceh resident T. Nyak Arief feared the guns would end up in public hands as the security situation was still precarious. To ask the Japanese to hand over their weapons to the People's Security Army (TKR), the official army of the Indonesian government, he dispatched his ambassador to Sigli.

When the Aceh resident envoy met the Japanese, they objected to a quick surrender of their weapons. They will continue to prolong the dispute between the Ulamas and the Uleebalangs based on the directives of Iino, the former governor of the Japanese military administration in Aceh. It had to be sharpened even further in order to divert the attention and pressure of the people of Aceh on the Japanese troops concentrated in Banda Aceh to be sent back to Japan (Nirzalin, Rizki Yunanda, Fakhurrizzi, n.d.). According to Iino im Muramoto, the balance of power between the two competing factions must be maintained. Consequently, the strength of the Uleebalang was weak at the end of November. He secretly ordered to return a dozen weapons to the parties which
were received by T. Tjut Hasan, Gunco Sigli. On the other hand, Muramoto promised each side that later on December 4 the new Japanese weapons would be fully handed over. In the last week of November, tensions in the Pidie district peaked. About 200 gunmen among Pidie *Uleebalangs followers* T. Pakeh Sulaiman secretly entered Sigli town in the middle of the night. All entrances to the city are blocked and all strategic points are occupied. Other members of the *Cape Sauh Army* came from *Lam Meulo* under the leadership of T. Abdullah Titeu, and from the *Cape Tumbak Army under the leadership of T. Sarong Peudada*. According to some authors, writes El Ibrahimi, the purpose of the *Uleebalangs* in entering the town of Sigli was to get ahead of the clergy and the PRI in possession of the weapons which were to be handed over by the Japanese on December 4. However, in reality, the seizure of Japanese weapons was carried out for the benefit of their struggle in accordance with the plans that had been prepared (Kurniawati, 2008).

On the other hand, the PRI under the leadership of Hasan Ali and Husin Sab mobilized its supporters along with thousands of people from *Garot* and *Gigieng* to surround the town of Sigli. T. Nyak Arif sent Sjamaun Gaharu with a small troop of TKR to try to find a solution. Also participating in the event was T. Panglima Polem Mohd. Ali as Deputy Resident, representing Aceh Regional Government, and T. Djohan Meuraxa as Deputy Governor of Sumatra. They succeeded in inducing the Japanese troops to hand over their weapons to the authorities (the Indonesian government) (Yunanda, 2019). Seeing the unfavorable situation, Nippon eventually handed over all of its weapons to TKR with several agreements, including guaranteeing the safety of the lives and property of Japanese soldiers to be entirely in the hands of the Indonesian government. Prior to the signing of this agreement, TKR through Sjamaun Gaharu at 03:00 WIB met with PRI/PUSA leaders who were among thousands of people outside the town of Sigli. The meeting was intended to persuade them to disperse as the issue of Japanese weapons which had become the trigger for the conflict had been resolved by the legitimate government. In other words, their fear of Japanese weapons falling into the hands of the *Uleebalang* would not happen again. However, in the midst of the TKR-led mediation, the *Uleebalang* had gathered outside the house of T. Pakeh Sulaiman. The Pidie *Uleebalangs* heard three shots aimed at the protesters. Things got hot again (Muhajir, 2016).

Many people outside the town of Sigli were shot dead. The TKR, who were in the ranks of the demonstrators and armed, finally fought back. Averted war ensues. No less than 50 people more or less were victims. The majority are from the PRI and PUSA Padang Tiji. Two of them are T. Rizal, one of the TKR members who was in the crowd of PRI protesters, and Sjamaun Gaharu's assistant. In order to anticipate *Uleebalang* resistance and make peace, the authorities in Aceh again
sent a TKR detachment from Kutaraja. However, the task of the TKR soldiers was hampered by the attitude of the inhabitants of Seulimum who disarmed them. The Acehnese authority has not lost its mind. He again sent the special police to Sigli together with T. Hamid Anwar, the chief of staff of TKR in Kutaraja. The deployment of the secret police succeeded in calming the situation. The parties involved were ready to negotiate and on December 6, 1945, peace could be agreed.

3. Cumbok's Full Attack

The clergy and non- Uleebalang united to form an organization to resist Uleebalang's anarchist actions. They formed a popular struggle group called Pusat Markas The Barisan Rakyat (Popular Front Headquarters Center) was established in Garot under the leadership of Hasan Ali and assisted by TA Hasan. Apart from this, they also established a branch in Glee Gapui under the management of Hasballah Daud and a branch in Gigieng under the management of Mohd. Hussein. With the creation of this organ of the popular movement, the war between the two camps reached its climax. Uri Barang On December 30, 1945, the formed party, completely ignoring the popular movement groups, attacked Meutareum and the surrounding villages of Ilot, Lagang, Lala and Pulo Carmen. This Cumbok army went on a rampage, looting and looting all kinds of people's goods, and burning down people's houses (Basri, 2017; Fikri, 2017).

Uleebalang's anarchist behavior this time was again reported by Tgk. Mr. Daud Beuereueh went to the Indonesian National Council for the Aceh region with physical evidence in the form of mortar fragments from the site. Seeing this evidence, Aceh KNID called a plenary meeting, which ended in deadlock until noon. Seeing that the meeting seems to be held there, Sjamaun Gaharu took the initiative to transfer the matter to the regional headquarters in Aceh. At the Aceh regional headquarters meeting, it was finally concluded that the thugs operating outside Pidiya in Kumbok were traitors to the motherland (enemies of the Republic of Indonesia). And at the second meeting, the Aceh MUD again concluded that the chaos of Luhak Pidie is being implemented by NICA and its associates. The resolution passed at the time was in the form of an ultimatum, so Cumbok surrendered or attacked around 12:00 p.m., January 10, 1946. However, this ultimatum was completely ignored by Cumbok as Cumbok's troops are tough. Finally, with the help of the people, the government launched a large-scale general offensive in Linmelol (Rizki & Latif, 2020).

Meanwhile, those who had already acted on January 7, 1946 attacked LP Thu from three directions. In the south, the masses led by Nyak Hasan were assisted by Tgk. Ahmad Abdullah, TH Husin, TH Zainal Abidin and Peutua Ma' Ali. The forces of Umma, Mohammad Tahir and Saeed Omar attacked along the railway tracks from the east. Meanwhile, troops of A. Gani Mutiara/Sjamaun Gaharu and Nyak Ishak/Daud Hasan attacked Cumbok from the east. Lueng Putu
was successfully crippled after attacks from all directions and resulted in casualties including T. Laksmana Umar who was killed and a commander of Hasballah Hajji from the PUSA force who was shot in the head but could still be rescued. On January 10, 1946, the People's Army successfully entered Teupin Raya without significant resistance. A day later, the Popular Front attacked Beureuneun again and broke through the defenses of Uleebalang at Blang Malu (Sangadji, 2005).

Meulo in full attack as *Uleebalangs* The strongest fortress. Massive fighting claimed many casualties. The New People's Line successfully entered the town of Rammelo on January 13, 1946, where it witnessed traces of battle and great resistance. TM Daud Cumbok's house, which was the defense base of Uleebalang, was in ruins from shelling. Even though Lam Meulo town is occupied, *Panglima Cumbok* and his team managed to escape. He was arrested on January 16, 1946 at Mount Seurava. Jantan is a Seulimum party led by Tgk. Ahmad Abdullah. Meanwhile, T. Muda Dalam, *Uleebalang Bambi* and Unoe who participated in the rebellion fled to Tgk's house. H. Abdullah Ujong Rimba for his protection. However, Tgk H. Abdullah Ujong Rimba handed it over to the people. Thanks to the successful capture of *Cumbok* After the leader, the Uleebalang regime that ruled Aceh for centuries under Dutch protection fell.

*The Uleebalangs were overthrown*, under Dutch auspices the landscape ruled by the *Uleebalangs* on the basis of a small absolute monarchy was reformed into divisions, ruled by street chiefs, on the basis of a democratic system derived from the constitution of 1945. The names of landscapes and towns - cities are also swapped. *Landscape For example, Cumbok* became Sakti District and Kota Lam Meulo, which is the seat of Prang Cumbok District, became Kota Bakti (Sudirman, 2014).

Japan's defeat against its allies was officially recognized by the people of Aceh on August 25, 1945, with the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima by the United States. This incident of Japan's defeat certainly affected the rulers of Aceh a lot who established too much relationship and cooperation with Japan.

Hulu Balang, who was deeply hurt by the policies of the Japanese military government, set up a committee (committe van Ontvangst) in Aceh to welcome the return of the Dutch to welcome the defeat of the Land of the Rising Sun. Of course, one of the things that really discredited the people of Aceh was that they were too happy with the victory of foreign powers who were in fact colonialists.

**CONCLUSION**

When we talk about the Cumbok tragedy, we have to go back to the past and the present. Pre-colonial Aceh was the land of Sultans/Sultanas, Ulemas and *Uleebalangs*. Throughout pre-colonial
history, it is these three elements which, despite internal conflicts, have dominated and maintained the politico-economic and socio-cultural balance of societies. In the history of nations, if we look at *The Cumbok Incident* happened in the early days of the independence of the Republic of Indonesia. So we're talking about the politics that happened when the event happened. In fact, the Dutch pursued a policy of dividing the empire. The Uleebalangs forced to side with the Dutch causing *clashes between the clergy and the Uleebalangs* The *Cumbok event* called Luhak Pidie and its peak in early 1946. It still feels like a dark story that happened in Aceh. Even the innocent children of *Uri Barang were victims of the Cumbok tragedy.*

Due to *the mistakes of the Uleebalangs* who sided with the Dutch and also obtained the privileges of the Dutch, the Uleebalangs became capitalists in their own country. It was on this basis that the people and the clergy united with all their strength against *the Uleebalangs because they were considered traitors to the motherland, traitors to the Republic of Indonesia.* Hypothesis of politically traumatic situations in *the Uleebalangs*. So if we look now, *Uleebalangs* Little to no involvement in government arrangements, politics, some even non-existent Use the title *Today's Teuku* and *Cut.*

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