TAHFIDZ AL QURAN CLASS: RELIGION COMMODIFICATION AND POPULAR CULTURE IN MUSLIM MIDDLE CLASS

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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to learn about the practice of religion commodification in the Al-Quran tahfidz program, as well as the strategies used to capture the middle-class Islamic market. The study was carried out in North Sumatra Province, specifically in Medan and the Deli Serdang. This study conducted in three schools are the Yayasan Pendidikan Shafiyyatul Amaliyah (YPSA), Rumah Tahfidz al Irsyad, and the Markaz Tahfiz Ali Syamsi. The research method used is a qualitative research method, which researchers believe is capable of exploring and describing data about the practice of religion commodification and marketing strategies in the Al-Quran tahfidz program. According to this study, a new Islamic middle class group emerged in post-New Order Indonesia. The emergence of a new Muslim middle class has resulted in a consumption pattern that differs from that of previous generations. They want to enjoy modernity while maintaining their Muslim piety. Capitalism responds well to this circumstance, resulting in the commodification of religion. Finally, the Islamic middle class's consumption pattern is currently a culture of including children in the Al-Quran tahfidz program. This culture paved the way for the establishment of Al-Quran tahfidz educational institutions. This consumption pattern is inextricably linked to the role of popular culture in the mass media in the creation of Islamic popular culture.

Keywords: Thafidz Al Quran, Muslim Middle Class, Popular Culture, Religion Commodification

ABSTRAK

Kata Kunci: Tahfidz Al Quran, Kelas Menengah Muslim, Budaya Populer, Komodifikasi Agama
INTRODUCTION

People's lives began to show signs of Islamization after the fall of the New Order oritarianism. This culture began with the formation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) not long before Suharto's demise. The formation of the MUI and sharia-based banks were also signs of Islamization at the time. The New Order's long history of marginalizing Islamic politics found resistance at the end of its reign. Suharto's resignation was forced by deteriorating economic conditions, civilian resistance movements, and military resistance from outside the Army. Suharto was forced to embrace his old enemy, the Islamic group, whether he liked it or not. Islam has grassroots cultural power, which was seen as a threat to Golkar's power at the time. It is not surprising, then, that the New Order marginalized Islamic politics for almost as long as it was in power. The dissolution of Parmusi, the ban on headscarves in educational institutions, allegations of terrorism engineering, and the Tanjung Priok tragedy are all examples of how Islamic politics were marginalized during the New Order era. However, near the end of his presidency, Suharto attempted to reconcile with Islamic groups in order to maintain his power, which was already eroding.

It should be remembered that the New Order's marginalization of Islamic politics drove Islamic groups to pursue da'wah. Muhammad Natsir, an influential Islamic figure in Indonesia, later founded the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), which then moved through Islamic education, beginning with campus lectures and progressing to the distribution of scholarships from Arab countries to Indonesian Islamic activists. Muhammad Natsir then channeled his alumni to preach at mosques around campus via a campus network. This is what gave birth to the Islamic middle class. Following the demise of the New Order, this group played an important role in Indonesia's political landscape. One of the fruits of this Islamic middle-class movement is the rise of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

Following the New Order, with the conditions of a more open democracy, Islamic groups naturally discovered freedoms not previously available. Da'wah movements that have previously operated "underground" are now gaining access to the public sphere. However, Islamic discourse wins the hearts of the wider community and influences various aspects of national and state, beginning with politics, economics, and culture. Several significant studies have been conducted to describe the symptoms of post-New Order Islamization. Vedi Hadiz (2019) conducted credible research on the formation of Islamic populism in Indonesia. During the New Order era, the close relationship between the state and business resulted in inequality and injustice. Following the
massacre on the left and the repression of the secular nationalist group, Islam became the only reciprocal ideology to this injustice. Hadiz (in Umar, 2010) identifies three groups that were marginalized by the New Order oligarchy: the first, poor farmers and workers left behind by industrialization; the second, educated middle-class people who are dissatisfied because their education does not allow them to go up; and the third, businessmen who lost to the New Order oligarchs. Despite their disparities in social class and interests, these three groups are capable of reproducing the language of resistance, namely tyrannized Islam. From the authorities' perspective, the language of resistance is then referred to as radical Islam. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the New Order regime was deposed more than two decades ago, the oligarchy that was built over thirty years has survived. It is not surprising that, despite the fact that Islamic discourse has found freedom in the public sphere, Islamic groups are still marginalized economically, allowing tyrannical Islamic discourse to persist.

Another description of post-New Order Islamization can be seen from Michael Buehler's research (2019) which examines the emergence of sharia regional regulations. This research was conducted in South Sulawesi, where the emergence of sharia regional regulations in Indonesia began. South Sulawesi is an area that became the basis of Darul Islam, Kahar Muzakar. After the fall of the New Order, South Sulawesi became the area with the most sharia regulations. From this research, it can be seen that there was a coalition between New Order politicians and hardline Islamic figures as a form of electoral political strategy. Names such as Amin Syam, Ilham Arief Sirajuddin and Syahrul Yasim Limpo are New Order politicians who used to play a role in the repression of Islamic groups. However, entering reform era, because of the strengthening of the Islamic discourse, like it or not, these politicians have to cooperating with Islamic activists in the regional elections. The sharia regional regulation is the product of a coalition between these two opposing sides. The goal is not merely to uphold Islamic values, but as a tool to gain electoral effect.

While there have been many studies on the rise of political Islam after the New Order, there have been few studies on Islamic popular culture after the New Order. Popular culture, which is focused on business and industry, is frequently regarded as unscientific. Despite the fact that political dynamics play a significant role in shaping popular culture trends. Ariel Heryanto conducted a well-known research on popular culture in Indonesia. Ariel (2015) investigates the post-New Order Islamization of popular culture in his research. Ariel observes the emergence of Islamic-based films and television shows as a symptom of Islamization through cinematic works.
The film Ayat - Ayat Cinta; Ketika Cinta Bertasbih; and the emergence of various television programs that broadcast da'wah are both examples of Islamization of popular culture. For Ariel this phenomenon describes a new Islamic culture that has not been seen before where Islam is cooperating with capitalism. Previously, Islam was always contrary with the West and capitalism, but not anymore. A new generation wants to enjoy modernity while still preserve their Islamic identity.

As a result, we can conclude that Islam and capitalism do not clash. The reproduction of Islamic popular culture is a form of compromise between two ideologies that were previously thought to be opposed. At this point, this study investigates the Tahfidz Al Quran as part of the commodification of religion and popular culture among North Sumatra's middle class. The emergence of various Tahfidz Quran programs in educational institutions is not adequately understood as the appearance of individual piety, but also as the commodification of religious ideology for economic gain. The Tahfidz Quran program is now thriving alongside the growth of Islamic popular culture in Indonesia.

The commodification of religion as a business practice causes a shift in Muslims' understanding of religious identity. The dimensions of the boundaries of religiosity and business are blurred, with the practice of religiosity trapped in its formalistic symbolic aspects but significantly (Husna, 2018) shifting from substantial to material (Arizal, 2016). In this way, Islam has been commodified (Fealy & White, 2008; Kitiarsa, 2008), in the sense that Islamic products are not designed to respect religious practices and sentiments, but rather to maximize profits (Hasan, 2011). Al-Quran is one of the four holy books that Allah Subhānahū wa ta'ālā revealed to mankind after the Torah, Psalms and the Bible. The process of recording revelation in the discipline of Al-Qur'an is divided into two categories: recording in the sense of memorizing and recording through writing the Koran. Each category has its own work area. The recording of the Qur'anic revelations by memorization took approximately 23 years, which was related to the gradual decline of revelation by utilizing the traditions of the Quraysh at the time, who were accustomed to memorizing verses and poems so that their ability to remember them was stronger than their ability to write. With the passage of time, the process of memorizing the Qur'an has evolved into an Islamic tradition that is spreading throughout society.

Reading the Koran has been a tradition in Indonesia since the 1940s. A Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran (MTQ) institution was established at the time, which was founded by Nahdlatul
Ulama. This institution was later institutionalized by the government and turned into a national Koran reading festival in 1968. Reading and memorizing the Koran cannot be considered a form of religious devotion in its current state. The emergence of various Koran reading and memorizing competitions exemplifies a new phenomenon in Islamic popular culture. Of course, all content shown on television or other forms of mass media is geared toward ratings and profit. This means that this program engages in the commodification of religious ideology.

The rise of Tahfidz Al-Quran educational institutions is in line with the rise of competition for reading and memorizing the Al-Quran in Islamic popular culture. For this reason, the focus of this research is to examine the practice of commodification of religion through the Tahfidz Quran program in several Islamic educational institutions; examines the strategy of the Tahfidz Al Quran institution in responding to trends from the Islamic middle class in North Sumatra. The Shafiyyatul Amaliyyah Education Foundation (YPSA), Al Ersyad's tahfidz house, and Tahfizh Syamsi Ali's headquarters are located on Jalan Sei Mencirim, Alley of Dusun 3 Mosque, Payageli, Sunggal, and Deli Serdang.

**METHODOLOGY**

This study is descriptive in nature and employs a qualitative approach. According to Moleong (2006), qualitative research is a scientific study that seeks to comprehend a phenomenon in its natural social context by emphasizing the process of in-depth communication interaction between the researcher and the phenomenon under investigation. Researchers can investigate commodification practices and popular culture in the Tahfidz Al Quran program in North Sumatra through in-depth interaction and communication. In-depth interviews are the only way to obtain various information and data to supplement this research. Field findings will then be processed and interpreted with the conceptual framework deemed relevant. There are several assumptions in the qualitative approach, namely first, qualitative researchers pay more attention to the process of how research is carried out rather than the results of the research itself. Second, qualitative researchers pay more attention to interpretation. Third, where researchers must go directly to the research field, qualitative researchers are the primary tool for collecting data and conducting data analysis. Fourth, qualitative researchers must be able to describe that researchers are directly involved in research, data interpretation, and achieving understanding of research results either by using narrative words or pictures (Eriyanto, 2001).
Religion's Commodification

Commodification is a process that is created and channeled into market economy channels on a local to global scale, and it is exacerbated by postmodern religion. Commodification does not create new religious forms and movements that contradict previous religious beliefs and practices (Kitiarsa, 2008), but it does position religion as an element in which the spiritual function of religion becomes one commodity that is appropriate for public consumption. In theory, the commodification of religion encourages us to rethink religion as a barter product. This is bolstered by the presence of transnational religious organizations and market networks. According to Habermas, the increasing commodification of life, including culture and religion, by large corporations has transformed society from a rational to an irrational society. Indeed, he sees this as evidence that system imperatives have colonized people's daily lives (Barker, 2002).

Adorno's perspective on the culture industry is another important criticism of commodification. Adorno first sees the cultural pathology concealed by instrumental reason. This necessitates integration, which eventually leads to interventions that impose universality and objectivity. Second, culture has made its way into industrial logic. Culture has shaped production and reproduction schemes, and it is sensitive to mass consumption life. In the style of advanced capitalism, this logic continues in the shadow of total freedom. Third, cultural production is an essential component of the capitalist economy. Cultural production is an essential component of the capitalist economy. Cultural production cannot free itself from capitalistic economic bondage. Fourth, a consumptive culture degrades culture. Different cultures make similar errors in the formation of society. What has resulted from injustice has been used to motivate mutually beneficial efforts (Adorno, 1979).

Religion and Popular Culture

However, popular culture cannot be separated from industrial practices. One of the characteristics of popular culture is mass production. Popular culture is spread through media such as television shows, music, magazines, and social media content. Because popular culture and industry go hand in hand, the orientation is economic gain. The reproduction of popular culture is closely related to the dominant ideology and values in society. It was unthinkable during the New Order era to have religious soap operas with Islamic nuance like those found in today's screen culture. Similarly, if television broadcasts show women and men in swimsuit, as was frequently the case in Warkop DKI, there will be backlash.
As previously stated, after the fall of the New Order, symptoms of a new Islamization culture emerged. This symptom is reflected in popular culture by the emergence of Islamic-themed shows, content, films, soap operas, music, and fashion. According to Ariel Heryanto (2015), this phenomenon is a response of capitalism to the Islamic market that has recently grown following the New Order collapse. Previously, it appeared that Islam and capitalism had to collide, but it has now been demonstrated that the two can work together to achieve the same goal or something entirely different. A new Islamic middle class emerged, eager to enjoy modernity while maintaining their self-esteem and identity as a pious Muslims. Heryanto (2015) refers to this as hybrid (mixed) identity.

The reproduction of popular culture via television broadcasts exemplifies how this hybrid identity emerged. Lecture shows on various television platforms will not sell well if they only emphasize religious aspects. As a result, it must be entertaining in such a way that it is worthy of being a television show. A television preacher must be skilled at public speaking, have a charming face, and dress in trendy clothes. These factors must even balance or be greater than the factor of expertise in religious science itself. If previous generations of religious lectures contained serious content with strong arguments, the current generation emphasizes the ease of listening aspect. The questions posed by the congregation are usually about daily life, and the preachers frequently respond without presenting any arguments. So the logic employed is that of capitalism, but with Islamic cultural content.

The same thing happened in the Tahfidz Al Quran competition, which is frequently broadcast on television. The competition is usually attended by children or teenagers. The ability to memorize Al-Quran texts at such a young age is certainly something to be proud of, especially for parents. Being a young person who can memorize our holy texts is a privilege, especially given that young people have a dynamic lifestyle and enjoy having fun. Attractive stage design, well-known hosts and judges, and trend-appropriate fashion styles make this event more than just religious in content.

According to the findings of this study, tahfidz Al Quran students were motivated by various hafidz competition challenges broadcast on television. Ridho Khairunnas, a 13-year-old Hafizhan Al Irsyad Education student from Serdang Bedagai Regency, stated that his motivation for studying at Tahfidz's house was to become a qori’ or reciter of the Qur’an as well as a hafidz like several idol figures who are idolized, including Ustadz. Hannan Attaki, Sheikh Alijabir,
Muamar Hasibuan, and others were among those present. His admiration fueled his desire to emulate an idolized character. Nazwa Farida, a Tahfidz Quran student, said her idol figure is Ustadzah Nabila, the Hafizh Indonesia judge. She enjoys it because she reads very well with her distinct rhythm, is good at explaining knowledge, is beautiful, and has a simple appearance. Ustadz Saihul Basyir is a hero to male Hafidz.

**The Ascension of a New Muslim Middle Class**

The rise of the Muslim middle class corresponds to an increase in Islamic or syar'i products such as beauty, lifestyle, film, health, services, fashion, and other sectors such as transportation and tourism. In the context of globalization and modernization, religious teachings have practically assisted in adapting to the times. Finally, Islam must adapt to the ongoing modernization process. 2011 (Ruslan). The attitudes and preferences of the Muslim middle social class vary in the midst of a diverse and modern population. According to Yuswohady, et al (2014) there are four characteristics of the behavior of the middle social class in Muslim society, namely apathist, rationalist, conformist, universalist.

The first segment, apatist, refers to a consumer who is knowledgeable, insightful, and often financially insecure. This type of consumer has low compliance in the realization of Islamic values. Islamic identity is only used as a formalistic symbol, or as the Islamic KTP. This type of consumer is typically unfamiliar with Islamic-labeled products on the market. Because they don't care about the label of Islam or don't care at all. This is the majority social class in Indonesia; they only have an Islamic identity to make themselves more acceptable to the wider community, even though they do not always take Islamic teachings seriously.

The second segment, rationalists, are consumers who have extensive knowledge and insight (are open-minded) but adhere to Islamic values in a minimalist manner. This group is known to be very critical and pragmatic, preferring products based on their utility. When it comes to purchasing, they tend to disregard the Islamic label entirely. According to them, the size of their needs, rather than the labels of Islam, sharia, and halal, is the most important consideration when deciding to buy or use services. The term "Islamic acceptance" refers to the acceptance of Islam as a whole, as opposed to the acceptance of Islam as a set of values.

The third segment is conformist, which means that Muslim class consumers tend to obey worship and internalize Islamic values in their normal daily lives. The existence of limitations in global insights makes this group tend to be conservative and less open to Western values and culture.
They believe that modernization distances itself from Islamic values and does not accept differences that contradict religious teachings. In facilitating the decision to buy goods or services, they will choose products that have sharia, halal and other branding issued by Islamic authorities and religious leaders that they become role models. Finally, there is the universalist segment, which consists of Muslim consumers who have global knowledge, a broad mindset, follow technological developments, and are consistent in carrying out Islamic teachings every day. These consumers practice religion with substantive not normative values. These consumers have a tolerant identity, are open to outside values, and have a broad and open mind.

The rise of the new middle class in Indonesia corresponds to an increase in education, particularly at universities, during the New Order. With the expansion of capitalism in Indonesia, the number of educated cohorts with bachelor's degrees is growing (and Southeast Asia at that time). After being marginalized for so long, openness to political Islam contesting in the public sphere has increased since the fall of the New Order. This circumstance gave birth to a new Muslim middle class in Indonesia. Here is also an opportunity for capitalism to reproduce Islamic popular culture in response to the desires of Indonesia's new Muslim middle class.

The Tahfidz Al Quran program is one effort to address the need for a more religious middle class. When asked why they want to memorize the Koran, most people say it's so they can give their parents a robe of honor in the afterlife. The memorizer also receives a guarantee of enjoyment at the end of the day. These motivations are not arbitrary because they are based on the Prophet's hadiths. As a result, many Muslims are attempting to do so with the goal of achieving these virtues.

Below is one of the hadiths about the benefits of memorizing the Koran that memorizers frequently use as an excuse. The following is the hadith:

From Buraidah al-Aslami r.a he said that he heard the Apostle say, "Whoever reads the Qur'an, studies it, and practices it, will be put on a crown of light on the Day of Judgment. The light is like sunlight. His parents were clothed in two (glory) robes which were never found in the world. Both asked: why are we wearing these robes? Answered: "Because you both ordered your children to study the Koran."

The costs associated with attending the Al-Quran tahfidz class are quite varied. MT. Syamsi Ali set a monthly fee of 750,000 rupiah, while the Hafizhan al Irsyad Education Foundation set a monthly fee of 1,500,000 rupiah. Both set a price for that because it includes the cost of students living and eating (boarding). Meanwhile, YPSA charges a relatively high annual fee of 14,000,000
rupiah for the tahfidz class without boarding. According to a YPSA parent, the cost of participating in the Tahfidz Al Quran program is not prohibitively expensive. Because, in his opinion, the costs incurred are comparable to what their children receive at school, "In terms of costs, it is relative, but with all the facilities and infrastructure provided by YPSA, I as a parent feel that the costs are quite feasible and appropriate, because lunch costs are included. in it and I as a parent don't have to bother thinking about the child's lunch problem."

The rise of a new Islamic middle class in Indonesia has resulted in Islamic consumption. As previously stated, religiosity plays an important role in this consumption pattern. The Al-Quran tahfidz program, for example, is an example of Islamic-based education consumed by the new Islamic middle class. Surprisingly, the tahfidz Al-Quran students were from abangan Islamic groups with no santri background. This means that post-New Order Islamic culture follows the tahfidz Al-Quran trend.

**Tahfidz Al Quran**

The word tahfiz is the masdar form of haffaza, originating from the word hafiza-yahfazu which means "to memorize" (Anis, et al, 1392). Hafiz is derived from three letters that mean to care for and supervise, according to Quraish Syihab. The word memorize was derived from this meaning, because those who memorize take good care of their memory. Also the meaning of "not careless", because this attitude leads to maintenance and "guarding". Maintenance and supervision include guarding. The word hafiz implies the preserver's emphasis and repetition, as well as its perfection. It also entails keeping an eye on things. Allah SWT assigned the angels Raqib and 'Atid the task of recording good and bad human deeds, and Allah will later convey His judgment to humans (Syihab, 2006).

While the word Al-Qur'an is Allah's word revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. Through the intercession of the Angel Gabriel, which was recited orally, mutawatir was told (Ash-Shiddieqy, 1992). Tahfiz al-Qur'an, as defined by Farid Wadji, is the process of memorizing the Qur'an in memory so that it can be recited/pronounced correctly by rote in certain ways continuously. The individual who memorizes it is known as al-hafiz, and the plural form is al-huffaz (Wadji, 2010). This definition includes two main points: first, a person who memorizes and then correctly recites it according to tajwid law must comply with the Qur'anic mushaf. Second, a memorizer constantly keeps his memorization from forgetting, because Qur'anic memorization fades quickly (Nawabuddin, 1992). Thus, someone who has memorized several chapters of the
Qur'an but does not keep it continuously is not referred to as a hafidz al-Qur'an because he does not keep it continuously. Similarly, memorizing several juz or verses of the Qur'an is not considered hafidz al-Qur'an. The large number of fans and memorizers of the Koran is a form of Allah's guarantee for the Koran's preservation. In the letter al-Qamar verses 17, 22, 33 and 44 Allah regarding the word of Allah which reads "wa laqad yassarna al-qur'ana li adzdzikri" (And indeed We have made it easy for the Qur'an to be remembered), interpreted by al-Qurtubi as “……We make it easy for the Koran to be memorized, and We will help anyone who memorizes it, so is there a student who memorizes it, he will definitely be helped”.

It's difficult to believe that twenty years ago, there would have been numerous educational programs for Tahfidz Al Quran, as well as various tahfidz competitions. However, we are now witnessing the emergence of a new trend in Koran memorization. This trend, however, cannot be separated from the role of the mass media as a component of the mass industry. The national television broadcast of the tahfidz Al Quran competition had a significant impact on the emergence of this trend. The number of parents who want their children to memorize the Koran is growing. Capitalism then responded favorably. It is debatable whether capitalism and Islamic ideology share the same goals. However, it can be deduced from this that Islamic ideology and profit-oriented logic of capitalism go hand in hand.

**Al-Quran Tahfidz Institute in Indonesia**

There are several classifications of Al-Qur'an tahfiz institutions in Indonesia, including:

a) Al-Qur'an tahfiz institution dedicated to the study of the Koran. This institution follows the model of Islamic boarding schools and focuses solely on studying the Qur'an because it believes that studying the Qur'an requires special concentration. The Yanbu'ul Qur'an Kudus Islamic Boarding School is an example of a tahfiz al-Qur'an institution following this model.

b) Al-Qur'an tahfiz institutions that also teach other Islamic sciences like nawu, orof, balagoh, and other disciplines. This type of institution typically has an education curriculum distinct from the curriculums of the Ministries of Religion and Education, known as Kulliyatul Muallimin Al-Islamiyah (KMI). Daarul Huffaz 77 Bone is an example of this institutional model.

c) Tahfiz al-Qur'an institutions that also follow the government's educational curriculum. This institution, in addition to studying the Koran, also studies general subjects in accordance with government directives, which is in accordance with the wishes of parents who want their children
to continue their education to a higher level. The Daarul Qur'an Islamic Boarding School is one example.

d) Tahfiz al-Qur'an institution with a higher education system. This model is found in universities with a more difficult level of educational curriculum, because students are required to study sciences that intersect with the Qur'an, such as Ulumul Hadith and Ulumul Qur'an, in addition to memorizing the Qur'an. The Institute for the Science of the Qur'an is one example of such a model (IIQ).

However, as the times have changed, so has the movement for memorizing the Qur'an; its activities are no longer always carried out in institutional forms such as Islamic boarding schools or high schools, but can also be carried out in the form of communities or social programs. One Day One Juz (ODOJ) movement started by Bhayu Subrata in 2007 and One Day One Verse (ODOA) started by Ustad Yusuf Mansur as the founder of the Daarul Qur'an Nusantara Tahfiz Institute are two examples of this phenomenon. The aforementioned phenomenon demonstrates that the Al-Qur'an learning model has evolved in tandem with the times. If learning the Qur'an was done by gathering in one place during the time of the Prophet Muhammad Shallallhu alaihi wa sallam and his companions, it can now be done remotely using modern technology (Sofyan, 2015).

The evolution of the tahfidz Al Quran trend cannot be separated from the rise of popular culture, which is accompanied by the advancement of information technology. Aside from television, social media plays an important role in mass-replicating this trend. The audience is inspired by social media content that shows the recitation of the holy verses of the Koran as well as various tahfidz competitions. According to the findings of this study, Al-Quran hafidz competitions at the regional to national levels have become a venue for demonstrating the excellence of Al-Quran tahfidz institutions. It is clear from these various competitions which institution has produced outstanding Al-Quran hafidz. When a religious value is used in competition, there is an element of commodification present, and the aspect of religiosity does not stand alone.

CONCLUSION

Following the fall of the New Order, Indonesia experienced new signs of Islamization. After being marginalized for so long, political Islam has finally found its freedom in public ideological contestation. Many studies have been conducted to describe the phenomenon of post-New Order Islamization, but the majority of them have focused on political, military, and security aspects. In
Indonesia, however, there are still very few studies on Islamic popular culture. Despite the fact that Indonesia's political dynamics have a significant impact on popular culture trends. In the context of this study, the fall of the New Order's authoritarianism (along with the cold war victory of capitalism) has given rise to a new Islamic middle class in Indonesia. The term "Islamic culture" refers to the rise of Islam in the Islamic world. Previously, Islamic ideology and capitalism clashed, but now the two ideologies can coexist. Islamic values now have economic as well as spiritual values as a result of the commodification of religion. The focus of this research is the commodification of religion through Al-Quran tahfidz educational institutions as a response to the emergence of a new Muslim middle class. According to the findings of this study, the emergence of Al-Quran tahfidz educational institutions cannot be separated from Islamic popular culture, which is prevalent in the mass media. Various tahfidz Al Quran competitions have encouraged parents and young people to take part in the program. The relatively high cost of participation in this program is not a deterrent for parents of students. On the other hand, the spiritual values that characterize middle-class piety are the primary motivation for producing a young generation capable of memorizing the Al-Quran. This leads to the conclusion that Islamic ideology and capitalist logic can coexist. Both of these events gave birth to what is known as the commodification of religion.

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