

Public Administration and Sustainable Development in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper examined the predicaments facing Nigeria and how they have become more manifest in each attempt to attain democratic rule and economic reform. This approach provides an opportunity to observe how respect for human rights, democratization and broad-based sustainable development efforts have interacted with market-oriented economic policies in the past three decades in Nigeria. This paper adopted the analytical method and relies on secondary data and utilizes the content analysis for interpretation of data collected. The paper concludes that It is very critical for senior public administrators and political leaders to make the civil service employees to act ethically, not only in times of crisis or scandal, but on an everyday basis as well. It is also imperative for consideration to be given to ethics in hiring, performance evaluation, and promotion decisions, and that, if the civil service mission includes ethical behavior, then it should be evaluated along with other competencies.

Keywords: Sustainable development, public administration, democratic rule, economic reform

Introduction

This paper is about how public administration can contribute to sustainable development in Nigeria. The relationship between the army junta and federal bureaucracy in Nigeria is used to illustrate how public administration failed during the military regimes in Nigeria. The overall problem of public management in Nigeria is illustrated by several case studies. Nigeria's Structural Adjustment policy, and the difficulties encountered when the federal ministries responded differently, often adversely, to its implementation is also used to reveal the relationship between the military and public administrators in the nation. As background, the study has traced Nigeria's problems with political development, and especially the roles played by the nation's military rulers and higher bureaucrats since the country gained its freedom from British colonialism.

If the future could be predicted, policymakers and public managers could rationally work toward accomplishing known results. Unfortunately, the future is contingent upon many complex social, political, economic, and technological factors. Even if we were able to quantify these factors today, there is no guarantee that they would remain constant in the future. This suggests that predicting the twenty-first century of public management is an impossible task. However, forecasting the twenty-first century is a risky business at best, but trend analysis and speculation about future possibilities may help us understand what events are likely to be continued and how we may avoid certain undesirable consequences if particular scenarios are implemented. The dilemma of centralized economic decision-making and the widespread implementation of policies in Nigeria have taught us a painful but crucial lesson. Economic progress is essentially hampered by military intervention and the patrimonialization of the state machinery. When economic freedom – expressed through the market – is encouraged and strengthened, economic progress thrives. The blatant insignificance of centralized economic decision-making is the primary factor contributing to Nigeria's development's elusiveness. Economic retardation is now the standard argument against government involvement in the economy, and as a result, this line of reasoning has lost credibility. The salient fact is that the primary cause of poverty in Nigeria is poor governance, and the best single solution is less government. Further, the rule of law suffered during the military regimes in Nigeria. In order for Nigeria to develop in the twenty-first century, the rule of law has to be revived to the fullest capacity.

In the twenty-first century, market-oriented policies must be prioritized over government ownership and interference by Nigerian authorities. Economic development and economic management have not and will not be reliably correlated as a result of government involvement in economic matters. Therefore, unless there are a few unique situations that are relevant to the interests of the country, government intervention as a policy choice must end. The somewhat rational preference for some sort of centralized government socioeconomic decision-making as the foundation for nation-building and as a means of modernization has been reinforced by political expediency over the past forty years, but it is now necessary to break away from this policy framework and put liberalized economic policies into place. Almost fifty years after gaining independence and the freedom to formulate and carry out domestic policies

But like so many of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, those policies are now seen as failing, and it's time to try and end the spiral of hopelessness that the military and its elite bureaucrats have sparked. In order to maintain a higher standard of living and foster an environment that is neither anti-democratic, antisocial,

anti-progressive, or anti-entrepreneurial, policy reform is therefore urgently needed. This kind of reform would allow people to have the freedom to make their own decisions. A country's economy would be able to adapt to the constantly shifting global economy and even seize chances if people were given the freedom to make their own decisions. The twenty-first century may see policy reform

The Nigerian leaders must adopt a posture of good leadership in order to carry out policies. Without stability and consistency, government and investment will continue to struggle. Effective leadership can ensure good governance. The conditions for promoting economic advancement can be created by effective governance. In the context of managing national affairs, good governance is understood to entail the exercise of legal power and authority. It has institutional, tactical, and political components. In addition to being excellent government, it also suggests bureaucratic transparency, political responsibility, freedom of speech, and the ability to develop competence. It also calls for prudent financial management and a civil service that is both professionally competent and honest. The 21st-century reform initiatives that the Nigerian government adopts will also dictate the rate of sustained

Literature Review

Military and Bureaucracy

The reality is that the military is unable to form a coherent, unified, and corrective force, despite the fact that the primary objectives of the Nigerian military junta were to restore public order and foster economic development. Instead, they are a reflection of every ethnic and socioeconomic conflict that has existed in the nation ever since it gained its freedom. Military administrations, like those of Gowon, Babangida, and Abacha, failed miserably to eradicate corruption and uphold law and order, even though the greatest instability and highest levels of unrest happened during civilian regimes. Both the previous period's (1966–1979) and the more recent military governments (under Buhari, Babangida, and Abacha) seem to have been hollow declarations of purpose for reform.

The military government is paralyzed due to a number of issues, including low modernization, persistent interethnic rivalry, persistent thievery and brigandage, regular industrial strikes, poor economic performance, high inflation, and uneven national development. The military lacks the knowledge, expertise, training, and mindset necessary for social and economic advancement, as noted by Henry Bienen in 1970, and this finding supports his claim. More than during the British colonial administration, the military maintains arbitrary control. A highly unequal allocation of chances and resources, along with a persistent reliance on higher public bureaucracy, is revealed in interviews done between 1997 and 2000 with top military officers, federal public servants, and coordinators of development programs. That is what the latter advises.

President Obasanjo has taken a positive step by signing a contract with the United State military to train the Nigerian army on how to conform to democratic role. It is the hope of the author that such training will yield the required results in the future (Eneanya, 2015).

Despite the 1988 civil service reform, which increased professionalism and accountability, corruption has continued. Additionally, when more states were added, the administrative services rapidly expanded, and public bureaucracy hiring practices were based on the idea of federal supremacy. A significant endeavor was undertaken to recruit staff members who possess knowledge of development administration. However, the junta never went through with putting these changes into effect. The army junta's tendency to downplay the role of bureaucrats prevented it from realizing how administrators help the government choose and implement development policies that are appropriate, how they can be used to boost public sector management, encourage social equity, accelerate economic growth, and generally enhance international operations. Furthermore, the military government, impacted by

Although the division of the nation into ever-increasing administrative states and zones by successive military juntas may have given them greater opportunities to thwart secessionist movements, the process also repeatedly increases the number of inexperienced, unskilled, and easily corrupted bureaucrats at the lower level. In these conditions, it is challenging to predict political progress. The dispersed, less professional bureaucrats in the various states seem to have a considerable edge over the administrators who staff the federal ministries, another effect of the more centralizing military elites. Does this clarify why there are so many coups and countercoups, why the ruling juntas' top leaders shift, and why the junta and the federal ministries' higher bureaucracy have conflicting interests? Put another way, creating 36 states is not a solution to Nigeria's tribal and ethnic issues. The army high command, on the other hand, appears disorganized, and the federal bureaucracy at the top is becoming more and more unstable—so unstable that there is a great deal of internal and external friction inside it. In Nigeria, coordination between the military and higher bureaucracy is necessary for effective decision-making; yet, this cooperation has significantly decreased. Nigeria's predicament suggests a breakdown in civil-military decision-making, leading to persistent failures in accomplishing declared national objectives (Eneanya, 2015).

The welfare of public servants in Nigeria needs to be addressed. Public administrators are underpaid, lacking in

motivation, a sense of purpose and direction. The only sense of direction that they have is how they could use their position to enrich themselves. The national interests have become secondary to personal interest. Some national, state, and local employees are often paid their salary late or not at all for several months. This delay in payment has galvanized corruption among civil servants. To make matters worse state and local government have neither published nor audited their accounts in the past 25 years. That is one of the reasons why vast amounts of money seep into pockets of corrupt senior public administrators. Thus the civil service situation in Nigeria can be described as deplorable, ineffective, wasteful, and sloppy and operate a spoil system in its recruitment and promotion programs. The author believes that the Nigerian government has outgrown and outlived its policies, structure and rules for carrying out government business and for managing its citizens and the economy. For change to take place in the government several norms have to be changed. The government of President Obasanjo must start addressing the problems of the public service by developing a professional public administration that is competent and based on a merit system.

The environment within which Nigeria public administrators and military work shapes their attitudes and the environment are made of system and structure. The systems however, reinforce the mentality that change is not necessary. Therefore, the Nigerian leader's job is to encourage its people, public administrators, and military to question and challenge those systems that prevent great performance. Many organizational systems in Nigeria require a total overhaul. These institutions include the governing systems, administrative systems, organizational behavior and processes. The government needs to introduce an inter-relationship management program that will enable both public administrators and all public institutions to understand that every change process must begin with a picture of the destination shared by everyone. Citizens, Public administrators and the military must be re-trained to accept that self-interest need not take second place to rights, justice, and fairness. Nigeria's civil service values of high performance should include learning, focused mission, and a nurturing community culture. The concept of new public management should be introduced in the nation. In practice, the implementation should place a premium on innovation, risk taking, training, the right tools, communication, and work measurement. The new public management practice in Nigeria should nurture community culture that is characterized by teamwork, employee participation, flexible management, and reward and recognition (Eneanya, 2015).

Dependence on External Technology and Raw Materials

The expected new technologies promised by the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy were not produced by private sector companies in Nigeria. Nigeria still depends on foreign raw materials and technologies. The goal of structural adjustment was to address Nigeria's payment imbalance and lower its external debt. However, the constant importation of raw materials, equipment, and spare parts created abroad continues to deplete its external foreign exchange reserves and increase its international debt. Consequently, the nation's economic issues persist, and things can only become worse. Nigeria will continue to search far into the twenty-first century for a technology that makes use of locally accessible resources and generates goods that meet domestic demand. Almost two decades of indigenization and self-reliance programs in other sectors of the Nigerian economy were overthrown by the structural adjustment program, which is remarkable. Despite being relatively young, SAP/Make-or-effectiveness Buy's is debatable, particularly in light of its minimal effect on the nation's private sector businesses. Most likely, the private companies, who via their manufacturers association were among the driving forces behind the comprehensive plan for resolving Nigeria's technological issues, have already benefited greatly from the estimated \$250 million in research and development that government ministries and agencies have contracted out. According to this study, private companies were given R&D contracts for a total of \$163.67 million by the four ministries under investigation. These businesses persuaded the government

Related to the matter of "slippage" between policy intent and policy output are the reasons underlying two important modifications to the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy in 1987 and 1989? The first of these modifications was tied to ministerial budgets that had already been set. Therefore, the need existed to provide interim financing while the ministries and agencies geared their budgets to accommodate the contracting out requirements of the policy. Similarly, in 1989 the policy was expanded to cover ongoing R & D and related studies in the natural sciences, as well as an urban, regional and transportation topics. This later modification to the policy was supposed to encourage an expansion of funding for contracting out purposes.

Implications

The implications of this study for the Nigerian government can be summarized as follows: First, governments should not introduce policies which may not be implemented or maintained, no matter how attractive these policies are in principle. Second, policies, which are working, should not be changed no matter how costly they may seem in terms of resource mis-allocation. Finally, in choosing among policies, priority should be given to those that enhance the stability of the overall policy environment. Although the SAP/Make-or-Buy policy recognizes three of the four elements in any public policy (i.e., goals, means and constraints) the true picture cannot emerge if the fourth element is not analyzed. This fourth element pertains to the roles and power of the policy implementers or bureaucrats. In Nigeria, policy touching upon the development of technology is made at the level of the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Unfortunately, however, it is not whether good policies are formulated, or even whether the means are provided for the fulfillment of these policies, but whether the policy is implemented, poorly implemented, or not implemented at all (Eneanya, 2015).

Therefore, putting the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy into practice is its fundamental component. In Nigeria, the implementation of each policy initiative usually depends on one or more government ministries or

organizations whose job it is to meticulously craft the procedures necessary to fulfill the policy's objectives. It is imperative that such a ministry or agency employs seasoned bureaucrats. It is also crucial that discussions prior to the establishment of the policy engage people who will carry out its implementation. Participation in a policy's preparation phase fosters agreement among those carrying out its execution. One could argue that in the absence of this spirit of cooperation, the policy will be perceived as an imposition and hence opposed. In

It is clear; the objectives of the SAP/Make-or-Buy Policy have not been achieved. Moreover, certain policy measures that were introduced such as the policy guidelines were not developed with the ministerial consultation they required. Nevertheless the policy did heighten awareness of the need for new indigenous technology, even if it is still awaited. Coherent political organization, bureaucratic competence and national decision-making are essential requirements of all national development programs but genuine progress is not likely to emerge in Nigeria until the military junta retires to the barracks and new self-governing institutions are erected over a political system anchored in democratic practices. The analysis in the text reveals that an increase in a series of factors such as human and physical capital accumulation or a decrease in the growth of labor force can obtain an increase in GDP per capita in Nigeria. On the other hand, considering an international area, controlling the behavior of real equilibrium exchange can contribute more in sustainable growth of GDP (Eneanya, 2015).

Fostering Decentralization and Citizens Empowerment

Present problems and future challenges can become avenues for innovative projects as public managers begin to take morally responsible and proactive actions toward promoting the public interest. However, to be responsive to new ideas and possibilities, public managers must take critical action to create organizational changes. For problems to be solved and for the quality of work life to be improved, structures and processes of public ministries and agencies must be rendered more adaptive, collaborative, and innovative. This requires the development of a decentralized and humanized workplace. Policymakers and higher-echelon public managers will also have to design new forms of organizations that will give more power in decision making to lower-level managers and employees, facilitate diversity of ideas and interests, and allow opportunities for learning and self-improvement. Potentials for individual growth and learning are denied under a system of a rigid bureaucratic-authoritarian regime that stresses conformity and loyalty of its members. Centralized management, such as prevails during a military regime, in which the head of state controls the national government, and at the same time appoints military administrators at the state level, only promotes a hierarchical consciousness in which employees must assume loyalty, conformity, commitment, and dedication to the head of state in order to be assigned tasks and responsibilities. There has been no meaningful dialogue between superiors and subordinates, central bureaucrats and local government officials, and between military juntas and civil servants in Nigeria. The channel of communication that has been in place is very dictatorial or authoritarian in nature. This type of communication process is essentially vertical and involves little mutual learning or understanding and needs to be reformed if the nation wants to achieve broad-based sustainable development in the twenty-first century (Mukoro, 2019).

Decentralization is a sometimes-confusing term. As Devas (1997) points out, decentralization, as most often used, means some form of transference of power from the national to state and local governments, thereby strengthening local autonomy. But it can also mean decentralization of management whereby lower levels of governance are given discretionary authority to manage programs and are held accountable to a higher-level authority for meeting performance standards. Several pressures have emerged in nations around the world to advance decentralization. A popular, widely held notion is that decentralization fosters democracy (Slater 1997). Citizens are believed to have a more effective voice at the grass-roots level. Decentralization structures help reduce the level of political volatility by offering citizens on the periphery channels the opportunity for political participation by presenting, the opportunities to express demands, and by reducing the distance to points of political access. Following decades of centralization planning in Nigeria, there is a growing perception that federal bureaucracies have become as bloated and distanced as to produce great inefficiencies and to render them increasingly ineffective. Decentralization would move policy input and decision making out from the federal government to where varieties of needs can be accommodated and varying state and local governments accounted for. For example, reform-minded bureaucrats in France and Italy promoted decentralization to regions so as to gain bureaucratic efficiency and to relieve the national government of "bureaucratic overload" (Rousseau & Zariski 1987, 270).

A decentralized public management system must be sustained through sharing of management's power with lower-level employees in Nigeria. Executive power in the twenty-first century should be defined as the moral and honorable exercise of authority within a set of ground rules to which the national and state bureaucrats, senior directors, military juntas, lower-level managers, and employees as a whole have agreed. Through the process of empowerment, employees will have the opportunity to develop their abilities to solve problems and to improve themselves. Empowering people through decentralization do not imply abandonment of organizational authority. It simply opens up humanistic possibilities for improving organizational effectiveness by establishing collaborative relationships between ministries and their civil servants. Etzioni (2016) describes the development of mutuality as one dimension for renewing management. He stated that "mutuality is not an altruistic affair. There is an expected reciprocity of affection and respect. Individuals are so composed that they need to receive affection and respect regularly, just as batteries need recharging".

In comparison, Japanese management is paternalistic; there is a great deal of mutual respect and affection between military juntas, senior bureaucrats, and lower-level employees; and management's efforts to promote the welfare

of civil servants are based on both organizational interests and human concerns. Nigerian management's relationship to lower-level employees, on the other hand, is basically authoritarian. This needs to change in the twenty-first century. The successful experiences of self-management and industrial democracy in Scandinavian nations are based on the common beliefs among government executives, politicians, clergymen, unions, managers, and workers about the values of enhancing democracy in the workplace. Lastly, decentralization is not only advanced as a curative to federal bureaucratic inefficiencies and a way to promote diversity rather than standardization, but also as a means to partially relieve federal government fiscal woes. Restructuring will enable the federal government to push financial burdens downward (Mukoro, 2019).

Education for Raising Consciousness

The education of Nigerian public managers and citizens to understand democratic values and processes is imperative because democratic administration needs the participation of competent public employees as well as input from active citizens. Education can take various forms, ranging from the traditional pedagogical methods of learning in class to long-distance learning that sometimes characterizes adult education. There has been a lot of enthusiastic interest in constitutional engineering, political parties, politicians, elections, and election monitoring in Nigeria for transition into a democratic government in the near future. But the role of workers has particularly been ignored even when the new and traditional political parties and human rights and prodemocracy movements have had to rely on this particular constituency in their contestation for power. Yet Nigeria cannot afford to ignore the popular institutions and constituencies that determine the dynamics of politics and shape the overall character of the transition from military regime to a multiparty system (Ihonnvbere 1994; Soyinka 1996; Lemarchand, 2014). Why efficiency-enhancing changes are sometimes combined with inefficient elements? Why do nations adopt particular reforms at particular times? Why, at other times, do they delay adopting reforms that would clearly increase aggregate welfare? Scholars have suggested a number of answers to these questions, both in general and in the context of particular cases. These mostly focus on three sets of factors, the interests of actors, the nature of political institutions, and the policy choice of individual reformers.

Institutions

By institution I mean the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. For a given distribution of interests and power among social actors, various scholars have argued that different political institutions can induce different policy outcomes. What type of institutions is most conducive to enacting and implementing economic reform policy in Nigeria in the twenty-first century? One common view is that institutions that insulate economic decision-makers from interest group pressures improve the chances of efficiency-enhancing reform. At its most extreme, the argument has been made that military political institutions permitted Nigeria to ignore populist pressures, demobilize social organization, and implement economic reform (O'Donnell 1973; Ihonnvbere 2017). Democratic institutions, some argue, preclude such insulation. More limited claims have been made about particular institutional structures within democracies. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) contended that constitutions that strengthen executive and insulate economic ministries are seen as promoting reform. Independent Central Banks tend to be more financially conservative than those more dependent on government or parliament politicians, who are more likely to yield to populist temptations.

Empirical studies have found no clear relationship between democracy or military regimes and reform, and the evidence on executive strength or insulation and reform varies depending on the geographical scope of the study. What is important for every government is the concern of strengthening the institutions of the state to make them more effective in advancing the welfare of its citizens and in managing society in line with the nation's mandated authority. As institutions or organizations (military and bureaucratic) get older and tend to become less innovative and slower in solving problems, training programs should be planned with assistance from outside change agents, and organizational members may be given the opportunity to pursue educational programs to satisfy their personal need for learning. Adult education institutions should be developed to address these needs in the twenty-first century. Education for critical consciousness should also be emphasized at schools of public policy and administration in Nigerian universities. When students complete their college education, they would have learned various analytical skills, and scientific, political, humanistic, ethical, and moral responsibilities toward the public. The administrators of the twenty-first century should become reflexive individuals who can recognize that their technical expertise is embedded in a context of meanings. They must understand what their actions to others (clients and other employees) - and what the other's actions - mean to them. Reflexive administrators, if they are also proactive individuals, will have the ability to learn about both themselves and their relationships to the social world of Nigeria. Their perception of the social world will become clearer as they carry on meaningful dialogues with employees, clients, and the public. Through training, military juntas and administrators can learn the meaning of participation and the use of shared power. They can become aware of the significance of democratic values and processes and develop a sense of responsibility for representing, in the day-to-day execution of administrative tasks, the interests of the general public (Haggard & Kaufman 1995; Heilman 1996; Mukoro, 2019).

Civil Society and Interests

Various terms have been used to describe the organizations that make up the social network that constitutes civil society. The most common term used today is non-governmental organization. Charities, youth groups, service clubs, church groups, trade unions, hobby groups, advocacy groups, community organizations, grassroots community groups, community improvement and betterment groups, self-help groups, and all other kindred organizations are of civil society. The socio-cultural function of civil society groups is to promote social cohesion; combat isolation, alienation, and anomie; train future leaders; develop organizational skills; and raise the self-confidence and self-esteem of members. What this

diverse group of NGOs has in common is that each sets its members to work to produce a good or service that adds value to the lives of either the member themselves or their communities. The political functions of civil society groups are to increase participation in political processes, provide voice and political empowerment to members, and force governments to be open and more responsive (Mukoro, 2020).

Most simply, interest-based arguments contend that particular policies survive only if they serve the material interests of the most powerful coalition of actors. The structural adjustment policy reforms were delayed or never introduced during General Buhari's regime because the most powerful coalition had reason to oppose them. Therefore, in the twenty-first century, Nigeria should encourage the development of democratic institutions "manufacture consent" and cooping societal groups through participatory mechanisms. The kind of balance of power between citizens and government that such institutions would create may make bargains between them more credible. Even if democratic deliberation complicates the enactment of radical economic development in Nigeria, it is likely to make their implementation more effective. What policies are necessary to promote the development of social capital in civil society in Nigeria in the twenty-first century? Most important is protection for the human rights of free speech, association, and assembly. These rights protect the people who advocate starting civil society organizations, organize people to come together and form the group (association) and hold meetings and group activities (assembly). For civil society to develop in Nigeria effectively, two levels of protection of these human rights are necessary:

1. The various governments of Nigeria must not prohibit or repress these activities. The government may do this out of a belief in these human rights or because it lacks the will or ability to actively mobilize itself to carry out such repression. It is the latter condition that often allows civil society to get off to a flying start toward democratization in the waning days of dictatorship, when the government takes no positive steps to encourage such organizations yet lacks the will or resources to effectively repress them.
2. The federal government of Nigeria must protect civil society activity from repression by their nongovernmental enemies; repression of unions by employers; repression of poor people's organizations by local elites; and repression of radical or innovative political and cultural groups by defenders of traditions and orthodoxy.

Generally, security of the human right to organize is the single most important step in encouraging the expansion and normalization of existing informal or even underground social network (Diamond 1992; Weaver, Rock & Kusterer, 1997). People who belong to a multiplicity of organizations, each with a different overlapping membership have pluralist connections to their society and pluralist interests to defend. Secular civil society thus lessens the risk of religious strife and civil conflict.

Accountability, Transparency and Effective Governance

By now it should be apparent to the readers of this book that Nigeria's potential for development in the twenty-first century will be shaped by a number of factors. Some ingredients of effective governance are systemic to the whole government and the way it relates to people and organizations in the nation. Reforms in these areas could improve governance in all ministries and agencies. The payoff from these systemic reforms is potentially greater than improving the skills of one manager at a time or improving the manageability of one agency at a time. Accountability in this text means holding people responsible for their performance and holding public and private sector managers responsible for the results of their decisions. Accountability can range from the narrow, technical concept of financial accountability, which holds people responsible for correct handling of the money they control, to the broad concept of political accountability, which holds officials responsible for living up to the expectations they created while campaigning for election. In analyzing accountability in Nigeria in the twenty-first century, it is necessary to consider (1) who is being held responsible; (2) to whom they are being held responsible; and (3) how they are being held responsible (Mukoro, 2020).

Democracy and political participation will increase in Nigeria in the twenty-first century when accountability is supplemented by additional lines of responsibility to create a built-in system of checks and balances. This happens when government officials are responsible not only to their bureaucratic superiors on the organizational chart but also to a political party or constituency organization that they must keep satisfied and to a professional association that insists on its own standards for their performance. Thus, a lawyer working in an environmental protection agency may have to account for his or her actions, not only to a direct superior but also to environmental monitoring groups and to the standards of professional competence and ethics of the bar association. To measure accountability or performance in a government agency, it will be ideal to compare the annual performances of particular agencies in terms of cost-effectiveness and efficiency. In essence, this requires keeping track of the agency's output and comparing the ratio of those outputs to the expenses involved one increasingly common approach to measuring and monitoring governmental effectiveness is through public opinion polls.

The poll is not a precise measure of actual governmental performance, but it has several advantages. It can help Nigeria to measure legitimacy very effectively, and it would increase democratic accountability if the opinion polling is performed regularly and independently and if the results are announced publicly. Both accountability and an effective rule of law require open and public procedures, in other words, transparency. They would also require that information about the economy and society be regularly and objectively collected and widely published. Without information about policy and program results, policy and program accountability are almost meaningless (Akpotor & Orhero, 2021). Transparency and good information systems should be two characteristics of a system of effective governance in the twenty-first century in Nigeria. Olowu (1999) contend that reforms aimed at enhancing the accountability and transparency of Nigeria's public administrators would therefore need to empower the people through a variety of institutions that can provide leverage for the public to demand and assert accountable performance. He further stated

that such institutions would include vibrant medium and small-scale private sector organizations, effective local governments that are accountable to the people rather than to the central government. These institutions should also be able to enforce the rule of law whenever their policies were deliberately violated.

Economic Stabilization and Sustainable Development

Proponents of neoclassical economic theory, led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, argue that the solution to this problem requires rolling back the role of the federal government to get it to do only those things that governments have to do and can do well (Fisher 1998; Weaver, Rock, and Kusterer 1997; World Bank 1997; Nafziger 1997). This limits the role of government to providing those public goods that the private sector cannot provide, including national defense, protection of persons and property, and enforcement of contracts. It also includes maintaining a sound system of money and credit, undertaking some public works and agricultural research, and financing public health and public have no visible means of subsistence; intensified political competition could as well enhance the use of the state for plunder. Future plunder would require retention of means of control over industry and trade. There is optimism in the wind that the political rules of the game will change for good in the twenty-first century. It is in these portents that Nigeria must look for a potential change in economic rules for industrial development, as it was intended under the structural adjustment policy. Fiscal policy in the future must be reformed to reduce the fiscal deficit and economic inefficiencies in public expenditures and to redress the imbalances in public expenditures and taxation. The first would help reduce inflationary pressures in the economy as part of macroeconomic stabilization, and the second would improve economic efficiency. For example, subsidies on transportation, fuel, and fertilizer encourage firms to consume more of these. Value-added taxes (VATs) are recommended because they can raise a lot of revenue and are fairly easy to administer. Fiscal reform for the twenty-first century should also promote decentralization of government, allowing local governments to raise revenue and spend it for local infrastructure and services. Decentralization as an important part of fiscal reform has been discussed in detail earlier in this final chapter (Mukoro, 2020).

An important part of reducing the fiscal deficit is the closing, privatization, or reform of state-owned enterprises (World Bank 1995). Privatization is meant to reduce economic inefficiency and income inequality. This has turned out to be an extremely difficult thing to do in Nigeria (especially), and the international financial institutions (IFIs) have lost their early single-minded enthusiasm for privatization. Instead of trying to privatize, the IFIs have recommended that developing nations (including Nigeria) remove the monopoly status of state-owned enterprises and allow private firms to compete with them (Orhero, Okereka, & Ogbe, 2021). The economic policy reform espoused by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has not gone unchallenged. Critics take exception to almost every aspect of the World Bank's structural adjustment model. They have demonstrated that except for Hong Kong none of the highly successful exporters in East Asia have liberalized their trade policies along neo-liberal lines (Fisher 1998; Nafziger 1997; Weaver, Rock and Kusterer 1997; Gillis et al. 1992). While borrowing money from the World Bank, the Chinese have assiduously avoided taking its advice. Korea is also widely known for the highly interventionist role its government played in its development. It must give us pause that most of the really successful have economies followed policies quite contradictory to those being pushed by advocates of neo-liberal, laissez-faire structural adjustment.

Why has government intervention in markets in East Asia not resulted in economic inefficiency and slow growth? The simple answer to the question is that the incentives provided by interventionist governments in East Asia rewarded results. Exporters were rewarded for export success; farmers were rewarded for growing food. In fact, the governments in Korea and Taiwan established elaborate mechanisms for tracking a firm's performance over time and rewarding it for success or punishing it (for example, through tax audits) for poor performance (Orhero, 2021). This was possible because the governments saw export success and meeting food needs as critical to national survival, had enough freedom from interest groups to design strategies that rewarded success, and were characterized by relatively honest and competent bureaucracies. This example demonstrates that when this combination exists, the alternative can work (Okereka, 2016). Thus, in the twenty-first century Nigeria's policymakers can learn something from the East Asian alternative approach to neo-liberal macroeconomic policies. The example from Asia demonstrates that non-Western nations need not model themselves on Western countries to attain development. Japan, for example, successfully modernized in its own way. Nonetheless, "culturally appropriate" development remains the most romantic yet difficult to achieve of the models available. On the basis of cross national analysis and research on the problems facing Nigeria, there has been an emerging consensus that the nation's policy and reform agenda needs to focus on the following in order for it to attain sustainable development in the twenty-first century. Nigeria's instruments of reform must focus on:

1. Accelerating trade liberalization to enhance the competitiveness of domestic producers and speed up Nigeria's integration into global economy.
2. Fostering private sector development as the principal engine of growth - but focus on the primary sector and the use of local raw materials.
3. Promote all aspect of ethical, fairness, justice and good governance.
4. Foster human resources and social development.
5. Build administrative and managerial capacity as an essential step in carrying out the needed reforms effectively.
6. Opening the banking sector to healthy, competition and international best practices in bank management, particularly through privatization; and strengthen the legal framework for banking activities (Cleeve 2018).

Democratic Programs and Nation Building

The shortest and surest path to democracy in Nigeria is to foster the growth of its prerequisite institutions. In a new democratic system, democratization efforts must take the form of capacity building, or institutional development work, in these key areas: law enforcement, education, the media, and organized civil society. In the absence of this prior

institutional development, more direct democratizing reforms of the system of government are unlikely to succeed in the first place or to sustain themselves even if they are initially successful. Given the antination ideology of the new global order, the ethnic and religious tensions that are rampant in Nigeria and the built-in economy of affection, nepotism, and corruption that characterize the nation, state building becomes a difficult process. Historically, state building preceded democratization and was generally accomplished by coercive means through conquests or in the process of resisting conquests (Orhero, 2019). Unlike in the twentieth century, nation building has now become fused with democratization. This fusion has serious implications to the manner in which the process of nation building can take place as well as to the nature of democracy. In regard to nation building, it implies that integrating the disparate groups and determining the relations between them and the nation can only be accomplished through collective decisions of all the parties involved and on the basis of carefully negotiated terms that are acceptable to all of them. Such negotiated terms also imply that if such agreements are not reached, the option of secession is available to ethnic groups. For this reason, democratization of the terms of nation building may involve the risk of accelerating nation disintegration (Mayer, Burnett & Ogden 1996). However, few ethno-national movements in Nigeria have demanded to form their own states.

Ethno-nationalists in Nigeria will clearly face serious dilemma in future. On the one hand, they will find integration with the state under existing terms and conditions of unevenness unacceptable. On the other hand, they will realize the risks nation disintegration and fragmentation entail. The aim of future politicians in Nigeria should be to occupy and professional environments that would attract and challenge well trained personnel to remain in the nation. Developed nations could be invited to periodically provide refresher conferences, seminars, workshops, and training to Nigerian professionals and highly skilled personnel to reduce their emigration abroad. The industrial revolution needed as part of a broader strategy for sustainable development in Nigeria will involve structural change on a number of levels: geographical, sectional, managerial, technological and societal. This has led most observers to emphasize the complexities and difficulties of making the necessary changes; industry in particular has stressed the need for a very gradual shift. However, because of the continuing lack of appreciation in environmental policy circles of the dynamic nature of industrial development, these difficulties have been overstated (Okereka, 2015a). Industrial development is a process of constant restructuring, as seen in the far-ranging changes in industry composition and location since the 1970s and in the rapid diffusion of personal computers during the 1980s. The issue is now how to harness this dynamic potential for sustainable development. Innovations of the need for time sit uneasily with industry's manifest ability to adapt to new circumstances and the pressing urgency of the human and environmental situation. Policymakers, industrialists and environmentalists have largely failed either to explore or act upon the multiple benefits that could flow from the pursuit of a vigorous Eco industrial policy. The continuing resistance to such a fast track to sustainable industrial development in Nigeria is thus evidence not only of lack of imagination and courage, but also a clear statement that most military, political and business leaders still do not take the sustainability imperative seriously (Mukoro, 2020).

It is essential to focus on the grass root or rural community level when making sustainable development operational. Processes that meet basic needs while protecting the environment and empowering the poor, thus internalizing the necessary trade-off, have been labeled 'primary environmental care' similar in many respects to primary health care. Primary environmental care is as little able to solve all environmental and poverty problems in a country or region as primary health care can solve all health-related problems. But there is ample experience that sustainable development will not be possible in the absence of the involvement and empowerment of the intended beneficiaries of the development process.

Policies toward the Private Sector

The private sector in Nigeria is composed of mostly agriculture, and it is larger than the government or public sector. In the past the military and bureaucrats set targets for production, employment, investment, exports, and imports for the private sector but usually have no binding policies to affect the target. This was one of the problems the structural adjustment/make-or-buy policy had in the nation. Beyond forecasting, the usefulness of target figures for the private sector depends on the reliability of data, the persuasiveness of the policymaking process, and policy implementation or control over the private sector. Implementing public policy in the private sector means government trying to get people to do what they would otherwise not do, invest more in equipment or improve their job skills, change jobs, switch from one crop to another, adopt new technologies, and so on. Some policies for the private sector in the twenty-first century in Nigeria may include the following:

1. Reducing monopolies and oligopolies. Good governance is vital not just to ensure the rule of law and protect against international organized crime but also to maintain and expand social and economic infrastructure.
2. Investigating development potential through scientific and market research and natural resources surveys.
3. Promoting private and public saving.
4. Providing adequate infrastructure (water, power, transportation, and communication) for public and private agencies.
5. Promoting better resource utilization through inducements and controls.
6. Providing the necessary skills through general education and specialized training.
7. Seeking out and assisting entrepreneurs. Small enterprises that can export should be supported in making this leap. Otherwise, production will continue to be dominated by larger and less labor, intensive firms. Small enterprises vulnerable to imports may merit temporary protection.
8. Improving the legal framework related to land tenure, corporation, commercial transactions, and other economic activities.
9. Managing new technology. Labor-saving technologies that are developed elsewhere and require advanced skills

may be inappropriate in Nigeria. Though vital, technological change will always be a double-edged sword, and its relationship with poverty reduction is complicated and poorly understood. The benefits of investment in technology can be maximized if it is accompanied by strong policies to create human capital and foster small enterprises. Creating markets, including commodity markets, security exchanges, banks, credit facilities and insurance companies (Nafziger, 1997).

Political economy and development theories of sequencing of reforms have a general utility but are not usually relevant to particular situations: The window of opportunity for public policy is usually narrow in Nigeria; however, the military, bureaucrats, and politicians should do what they think is advantageous or easy, irrespective of what economists or policy analysts tell them. Democratic principles and other empirical rules should guide whatever they do in the twenty-first century. First, politicians tend to think that removal of concession merits compensation. This generally does not make economic sense, especially in the case of urban concessions over rural areas. But it is good political sense if it buys peace or prevents secession of a valuable constituent. Policy-makers in the twenty-first century should ensure that the compensation does not become worse than the concession it replaces. Generally, one short, lump-sum compensation is better than an income stream. But the two are equivalent only where there is a functioning financial market in which one can be reliably converted into the other. Second, one is on safer grounds in deregulating real controls than monetary or financial controls. Investment takes time, so market structures generally change slowly; even a hurried, one-shot deregulation is likely to hurt someone soon. Developments in finance, trade, and construction, on the other hand, can be extremely rapid; reforms in these areas call for more forethought, negotiations, bargaining, conflict and compromise, or consensus building. Third, it often helps to divide the constituencies and tackle them one by one. For instance, if a subsidy scheme involves both subsidy to consumers and one from low-cost to high-cost consumers, it is sometimes strategically advantageous to turn it into a fixed-rate subsidy, thereby eliminating the cross-subsidy between producers. Similarly, if privatization involves closure and sale of assets, it is politically advisable first to pay off workers and thereby reduce the number of interested parties. Current military and bureaucrats as well as the new politicians of the 1990s are fond of saying that the best is the enemy of the good. This is not a very wise saying, but dividing up the best into elements and sequencing them often make it more practicable (Mukoro, 2020).

The fourth empirical rule for Nigeria in the twenty-first century is that booms are a good time to remove constraints on competition, and slumps are a good time to remove consumer subsidies and concessions. In general, the money value of concessions and distortions varies considerably over time, and study of their variation can help in timing their removal with the least disruption. Political and economic development in the twenty-first century in Nigeria requires openness, nondiscrimination, transparency, negotiation, and consensus building (Orhero, 2020). These factors are not only required by the military, the bureaucrats, the politicians and the policymakers; they should also be required by other interest groups, ethnic or tribal groups, political parties, and so on. To present these as the absolute good for the future will convince no one, but these factors will help in building a viable political stability, which will then spillover to economic development (Okereka, 2015b). Nigeria can no longer afford to formulate and implement policies that would fail like the structural adjustment/make-or-buy policy. The "vision 2010" economic development program being proposed is a good policy path. However, the Nigerian military should be more committed to establishing viable political stability and institutions before embarking on such a "vision." Under the current political turmoil the nation is too dark for its citizens to have the appropriate "bright vision".

Conclusions

This paper examined the predicaments facing Nigeria and how they have become more manifest in each attempt to attain democratic rule and economic reform. This approach provides an opportunity to observe how respect, for human rights, democratization, and broad-based sustainable development efforts have interacted with market-oriented economic policies in the past three decades in Nigeria. Without these contextual factors, economic reform would have not occurred either quickly or as they did. While economic crisis and debt clearly played a greater role in Nigeria's structural adjustment program, it is clear that the military and bureaucracy did not foresee the deep restructuring that eventually occurred. In the 1990s, there has been a clear rethinking of interest in participatory approaches to development. Beneficiaries' participation in designing and implementing projects, the empowerment of women and other disadvantaged groups, grassroots involvement in decision making and planning, and participatory rural appraisal are the rage. Much of the neoclassical or neo-liberal economics, macro-policy, relative prices, and structural adjustment approach are decidedly passé in the late 1990s, and Nigeria need to learn from this transition. Interestingly, in the 1980s, macro-policy, getting prices right, stabilization, and structural adjustment reigned supreme. In the 1970s, participation and empowerment of the poor, particularly in rural areas or integrated rural development, were popular, and macro-policy and relative prices were forgotten. Those of us who can remember that far back have asked, be we doomed to repeat history? Unless macro policymakers and grassroots activists develop more mutual respect and engage in dialogue with each other in Nigeria, the twenty-first century will be grim indeed. The cycle of military regimes, decline in citizen participation, and faulty macroeconomic policy needs to be broken in Nigeria.

It is important to foster dialogue between the major two disparate communities of grassroots activists and macro policymakers and advisers, though this will not be easy. Policymakers, particularly economists, and grassroots activists have vastly different beliefs about the influence of incentives, such as higher prices, on individual (for example, small farmer) behavior. Grassroots activists are more likely to emphasize the effect of structures and institutions on group behavior and outcomes. This difference in perspective leads to radically different policy prescriptions. Whereas economists working for the military recommend restructuring incentives, activists emphasize the need for collective

action. To the activist, the economists' incentives are part of the military structure of domination that perpetuates poverty. To the military, the grassroots activists' call for participation is doomed to failure. Both groups are right and wrong. There is ample evidence that prices and incentives both matter. With the military government's proactive confiscators tax policies toward small farmers - either through overvalued exchange rates or by paying farmers a small percentage of the world price for their products - farmers do not produce for the market and rural poverty results. But it is equally clear that unless those same small farmers find ways to solve collective problems, such as maintaining irrigation canals and ditches or farm-to-market roads, they will be unable to take advantage of market opportunities.

Both markets and organization matter in the twenty-first century. Macro-policies have a better chance of success if micro-practices reinforce them. Similarly, collective action has a better chance of success if macro-policies are supportive. This insight into the linkages between macro policies and micro-collective action provides the basis for building a shared vision of development between Nigerian communities, one in which growth is equitable, poverty is reduced, and there is more, rather than less, participation. Although we see the need for adjustment, we remain agnostic concerning the impact of the World Bank, the IMF, and other donor-financed neo-liberal or laissez-faire structural adjustment on sustainable development. However, a hopeful view of public policy, cautioned by appropriate realities and a willingness to meet challenges and opportunities, is fully warranted in the twenty-first century. Finally, improving the performance of public administrators in Nigeria demands that senior bureaucrats be liberated from the pervasive red tape. As illustrated by Geuras and Garofalo (2002), senior public administrators and political leaders in Nigeria need to walk the talk, model behavior, and trust employees if the civil service culture is to change. In conclusion, It is very critical for senior public administrators and political leaders to make the civil service employees to act ethically, not only in times of crisis or scandal, but on an everyday basis as well. It is also imperative for consideration to be given to ethics in hiring, performance evaluation, and promotion decisions, and that, if the civil service mission includes ethical behavior, then it should be evaluated along with other competencies.

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